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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 12-3002
___________
MS. ROSARIO ROSE TAYLOR,
Appellant
v.
KATHRYN H. ANDERSON, Office of Civil Right Census EEO Washington;
PATRICIA A. DENNIS, Area Manager Census Phila;
WESLEY R. GARRETT, Field Operations Supervisor Census;
JOHN DOZIER, Crew Leader; KIMBERLY WILLIAMS;
JENNIFER SELBY, Personal Assistant to Crew Leader, John Dozier
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2-11-cv-01170)
District Judge: Honorable Eduardo C. Robreno
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
February 19, 2013
Before: AMBRO, HARDIMAN and ROTH, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed April 23, 2013)
___________
OPINION
___________

PER CURIAM
Rosario Rose Taylor appeals pro se from the District Court’s order granting
summary judgment in favor of the defendants. We will affirm.
I.
In 2011, Rosario Rose Taylor filed a pro se complaint in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. In her amended complaint, Taylor
claimed that, while working as an enumerator for the United States Census Bureau
(“USCB”) during the 2010 census, she suffered adverse employment actions in violation
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Allegedly due to her race and national
origin, her crew leader, John Dozier, and five other colleagues maliciously tampered with
her completed surveys, delayed paying her, retook her fingerprints, did not assign her
work when other enumerators in her crew were given work, and ultimately fired her.
In support of their motion for summary judgment, the defendants argued that
Taylor failed to demonstrate circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination.
They offered excerpts from Taylor’s deposition testimony, in which Taylor attributed her
poor treatment to a personal quarrel – unrelated to race or national origin – between
Taylor and Dozier’s assistant, Defendant Jennifer Selby. Moreover, the defendants
asserted that Taylor was terminated because the census work was temporary, most of the
enumerators’ employment came to an end at the same time as Taylor’s, and Taylor had
“documented disciplinary and work quality issues.”
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The District Court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, finding
that Taylor failed to raise an inference of discrimination, and thus did not establish a
prima facie case of unlawful discrimination under the McDonnell Douglas burdenshifting framework. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
Even if she had, the District Court noted, Taylor offered no evidence to counter the
defendants’ legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the adverse employment actions
she suffered. Taylor timely appealed from the District Court’s judgment.
II.
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review
over the District Court’s decision granting summary judgment. See Alcoa, Inc. v. United
States, 509 F.3d 173, 175 (3d Cir. 2007). Summary judgment is appropriate when the
movant demonstrates “that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). We may affirm
the District Court on any grounds supported by the record. See Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d
798, 805 (3d Cir. 2000). For the following reasons, we will affirm.
III.
We analyze Taylor’s Title VII discrimination claim according to the McDonnell
Douglas burden-shifting framework. See Pamintuan v. Nanticoke Mem'l Hosp., 192 F.3d
378, 385 (3d Cir. 1999). Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, Taylor bore the
initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of a Title VII violation. See McDonnell
Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. If she succeeded, the burden would then have shifted to the
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defendants to “articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” for her termination.
See id. Taylor would then have had an opportunity to prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that the legitimate reason for her termination offered by the defendants was a
pretext for unlawful discrimination. See Jones v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 198 F.3d 403, 410
(3d Cir. 1999).
We agree with the District Court that, even assuming Taylor could prove her
prima facie case of unlawful discrimination, she failed to show that the defendants’
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for terminating her were a pretext. In response to
Taylor’s allegations, the defendants offered evidence that Taylor was terminated for
reasons other than race or national origin. Specifically, the defendants submitted
evidence that: (1) Taylor believed her employment contract ended before the time that
she stopped working for the USCB; (2) Taylor was terminated at the same time as many
other enumerators due to lack of enumeration work; and (3) Taylor’s crew leader and the
other enumerators had reported and documented their concerns about the quality of
Taylor’s work. The USCB therefore articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason
for Taylor’s termination. See Tomasso v. Boeing Co., 445 F.3d 702, 706 (3d Cir. 2006)
(stating that the employer’s burden of production at this stage is “relatively light, and the
employer need only introduce evidence which, taken as true, would permit the conclusion
that there was a nondiscriminatory reason for the unfavorable employment decision.”)
(internal citations omitted).
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Taylor subsequently pointed to no evidence that would allow a reasonable fact
finder to conclude that the defendants’ stated reasons for terminating her were a pretext.
See Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 764 (3d Cir. 1994) (finding that, to demonstrate an
employer’s stated reason for termination was a pretext, a plaintiff “must point to some
evidence, direct or circumstantial, from which a factfinder could reasonably either (1)
disbelieve the employer’s articulated legitimate reasons; or (2) believe that an invidious
discriminatory reason was more likely than not a motivating or determinative cause of the
employer’s action.”) Here, Taylor does not dispute that the census work in her region
had wound down at the time she was terminated, or that she was first transferred to a
different area, enabling her to work beyond the term of her contract. Although she
speculated that her negative performance reviews were motivated by animus based on her
race and national origin, Taylor pointed to no evidence, direct or circumstantial,
suggesting that the USCB terminated her employment for any unlawfully discriminatory
reason. See Tomasso, 445 F.3d at 706 (“[Plaintiff] must demonstrate such weaknesses,
implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer’s
proferred legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable factfinder could rationally
find them unworthy of credence, and hence infer that the employer did not act for the
asserted non-discriminatory reasons internal punctuation and citation omitted.”); see also
Robertson v. Allied Signal, Inc., 914 F.2d 360, 382 n.12 (3d Cir. 1990) (noting that “an
inference based upon a speculation or conjecture does not create a material factual
dispute sufficient to defeat entry of summary judgment (citation omitted); Spangle v.
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Valley Forge Sewer Auth., 839 F.2d 171, 173 (3d Cir. 1988) (finding summary judgment
to be proper where, after burden-shifting, plaintiff cannot raise a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether the employer’s proffered reason for an adverse action is
pretext for discrimination).
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
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